




Against Aesthetic Judgments 
Bence Nanay

Analytic aesthetics has been obsessed with mature, art historically well-informed aesthetic judgment. But the vast majority of our engagement with art fails to take the form of this kind of judgment. Crucially, there seems to be a disconnect between taking pleasure in art and forming mature, well-informed judgments about it. My aim is to shift the emphasis away from aesthetic judgments to ways of engaging with works of art that are more enjoyable, more rewarding and happen to us more often. 

1. 
Why do we pay a lot of money to listen to a concert or to buy a book? Why do we spend hours cooking a gourmet meal? And why do we exert a lot of energy to climb to a mountaintop? My answer is that we do all these things in order to have experiences that are important for us personally. These experiences matter for whom we are, for whom we take ourselves to be. 

We do not go to the concert or cook for hours in order to pronounce aesthetic judgments. Discussion of aesthetic judgments, the statement of whether a particular object is beautiful, graceful, or ugly, has dominated much of the history of (analytic, Western) aesthetics. The problem with that approach is that it is difficult to see why aesthetic judgments would matter for us personally. Why do we care? 

Making aesthetic judgments is neither fun nor particularly rewarding or even interesting. The temporal unfolding of our experiences in aesthetic contexts sometimes, but definitely not always, reaches its endpoint in an aesthetic judgment, but that is not why we engage with aesthetic contexts. One advantage of focusing on experiences rather than judgments, is that it can help us understand the personal importance and urgency of all things aesthetic. 

Yet, the concept of aesthetic judgment has been absolutely central in aesthetics (see Budd [1995, 1999] for especially explicit expositions of the centrality of aesthetic judgments in aesthetics). I should be clear about what I take aesthetic judgment to be. Suppose you go to the museum and look at a painting. You sit down in front of it and spend twenty minutes looking at it. Then you get up having formed an aesthetic judgment about it. Then you can communicate this aesthetic judgment to your friends or blog about it. Your experience of the painting lasts for twenty minutes. The judgment happens at the end of this process. Aesthetics has focused on the judgment at the end of this process, not on the twenty minute long temporal unfolding of the experience (with its shifts of attention, visual comparisons, etc). 

To make things even worse, making aesthetic judgments is an optional element of our engagement with art. Suppose that I spend twenty minutes in front of the painting but I just can’t make up my mind about its aesthetic merits and demerits – I suspend judgment. This does not make my aesthetic engagement with the work of art any less rewarding or meaningful – or any less pleasurable. 

A lot has been said about how aesthetic judgment differs from other kinds of judgments. But even if we acknowledge that the mental processes that lead to aesthetic judgment are very different from the mental processes that lead to other kinds of judgment, the emphasis in aesthetics is still on the judgment and not on the processes that lead to it. 

Importantly, even on those rare occasions when aestheticians are not talking about aesthetic judgment, they still ask questions that presuppose the theoretical primacy of the aesthetic judgment. Aesthetic judgments are propositions that attribute aesthetic properties to various entities.​[1]​ And the concept of aesthetic properties itself should be seen as derived from that of aesthetic judgment. Frank Sibley’s influential way of introducing ‘aesthetic concepts’ and ‘aesthetic properties’ explicitly derives these concepts and properties from aesthetic judgments in critical and evaluative discourse.​[2]​

And given that those questions within aesthetics that are not about aesthetic judgments make heavy use of the concept of aesthetic properties, it is easy to see how aesthetic judgments serve as the starting point for all discussions of the aesthetic domain. Take the question of whether aesthetic properties are perceptually represented.​[3]​ 

A major question in philosophy of perception is about which properties are perceived and which ones are inferred or non-perceptually represented. Beliefs can represent their objects as having any property. In the case of perceptual states, in contrast, the set of properties they represent their objects as having is limited. The question is how limited this set of properties is. Colour is a good candidate for a perceived property, whereas being made in England is a good candidate for a non-perceptually represented one. But there are many kinds of properties in between that are more difficult to categorise. 

A couple of potential candidates: it has been argued that we perceive objects as trees and tables [Siegel 2006], as being causally efficacious [Siegel 2005, 2009], as edible, climbable or Q-able in general [Nanay 2011a, 2012a, 2012b], as agents [Scholl and Tremoullet 2000], as having some kind of normative character or value [Kelly 2010, Matthen 2010], as having dispositional properties [Nanay 2011b], and as having moral value [Kriegel 2007]. 

So a natural question for aestheticians would be about whether aesthetic properties are perceptually represented. Do we literally see things as beautiful or as graceful, or do we just infer that they are (maybe on the basis of seeing them as having some other properties, e.g., shape and colour)? My aim is not to answer this question here or to argue that this question is intractable. Instead, my aim here is merely to point out how deeply even this question is rooted in an aesthetic judgment-centered way of talking about aesthetics. 

The general picture is this: Let’s start with aesthetic judgments. We know what they are. They attribute certain properties. And then we can ask whether other mental states may also be capable of attributing properties of this kind. But if we hold that aesthetics should be primarily concerned with the way our experience of the work of art unfolds temporally (whether or not this temporal unfolding culminates in an aesthetic judgment), then this general picture which begins with aesthetic judgments is just the wrong way of proceeding. We should not grant the assumption that we know the building blocks of all things aesthetic just because they are the building blocks of aesthetic judgments. We should examine our aesthetic engagement or experience in its own right and without borrowing any conceptual apparatus from the domain of aesthetic judgments. 

2.
In order to drive this point home, I’d like to proceed in two steps. The first step is to get personal and recount some touchy-feely and somewhat embarrassing confessions about my youth in order to highlight a major problem with the emphasis on aesthetic judgment. The second step will be to offer an alternative to the focus on judgments, which will be to focus on experiences instead. So, the touchy-feely stuff first. 

Exhibit A: I was 16, standing in the old Tate Gallery (there was no Tate Modern then), mesmerised by a Clyfford Still painting. I must have spent two hours in front of it there and then. I didn’t know much about Clyfford Still at that time. I knew he was an abstract expressionist, but that’s about it. I loved the picture so much that the next day, when I was supposed to visit the Tower of London and the Parliament with my high school class, I left them, going back to Pimlico to have another look.  

Exhibit B: rewind a year. I was so much into Michelangelo Antonioni’s film Blow-up that I went to the cinema to see it two or three times a week. I knew the dialogues of the entire film by heart. Each time, I left the cinema in a state of rapture, of having understood something really important about love, appearance and reality and other deep issues…

Exhibit C: rewind yet another year. I read a book that shook me to my core: Boris Vian’s L’Écume des Jours. I felt nothing like that ever before: I felt like laughing and like crying at the same time. 

The point I want to make is this: I now take Blow-up to be Antonioni’s single worst film. L’Écume des Jours is full of references I had no chance of understanding at age 14 and it’s way more mediocre than some of Vian’s other novels. I still think that Clyfford Still is great, but there are also many other great works of art in that collection when, for some reason, I fell in love with this painting. 

I went to Tate Modern just yesterday, in preparation for writing this piece to see how I reacted. Well, not very strongly. I also watched Blow-up again (on my laptop, as cinemas don’t seem to show Antonioni films any more), but I had to switch it off after 20 minutes or so, I just couldn’t be bothered. And I put down the English translation of L’Écume des Jours after a couple of pages (to be fair, it was because of the translation). 

These works of art gave me way more aesthetic pleasure when I first encountered them, knowing very little about art history, film history or the history of twentieth century French literature than they give me now, when I know a little more. I want to think that I am in a better position now to assess the aesthetic value of these works than I was at age 14-16. But my assessment is not as enthusiastic as it was then. 

With my 20/20 hindsight, I should condemn the aesthetic judgment of the 14-16 year old Bence, shouldn’t I? But if I hadn’t felt so strongly about these artworks, I would probably not have taken an interest in the arts that allowed me to pick up all that knowledge that now allows me to patronise the teenage Bence. 

3. 
What would be a mature, art historically well-informed aesthetic judgment in the case of these examples? Take the judgment I just made about Blow-up being Antonioni’s single worst film. That is the kind of judgment aesthetics should be about – we are told. The kind of liking I took in Blow-up as a 15 year-old is not what aesthetics is about. 

The examples in the last section were intended to show that there can be, and there often is, a mismatch between the maturity of aesthetic judgments and how much pleasure we take in aesthetic engagement. One conclusion that follows from this is that focusing exclusively on aesthetic judgments would leave something really important out of discussions of aesthetics: that aesthetic engagement is pleasurable and that it has some personal importance for us. We care about aesthetic engagement. It is not clear that an exclusive focus on aesthetic judgment could do justice to this very simple fact about aesthetics. 

But there is an additional reason why I introduced the examples in the last section. We have seen that it is not the case that the better informed our aesthetic judgment is, the more pleasure we take in making them (cf. Levinson [1996, 2002]). But it’s not just that we should not leave out pleasure and personal importance from the discussion of aesthetics (sacrificing these for the exclusive focus on aesthetic judgments). It’s that talking about mature, art historically informed aesthetic judgments presupposes some experiences that are pleasurable and not at all mature or art historically informed. 

When you step into a room with many paintings in a museum and take a quick look around, maybe you like some of the pictures on display, but not others. You have no idea who painted which picture, so any art historically well-informed mature judgment is out of the question. But this initial liking is what determines which painting you will approach and spend more time exploring. The only reason we are in the position to make all things considered well-informed aesthetic judgments is because we took a liking to some artworks earlier – maybe just seconds ago, or decades ago, and that’s why we’re engaging with this artwork and not some other one. 

4. 
Let’s take a step back. We have two instances of aesthetic engagement here. The experience I had as a teenager (very positive, very pleasurable) and the judgment I am making now (judging the work somewhat mediocre, not very pleasurable). The latter is what we call a mature well-informed aesthetic judgment. And the latter could not have happened without the former. The question is this: what explains the aesthetic pleasure of the earlier aesthetic engagement? If we restrict our discussion to aesthetic judgments, it is difficult to see how we can answer this question. It can’t be the maturity of our aesthetic judgment because that aesthetic judgment was not at all mature. Maybe the pleasure of the earlier experience was completely inadequate and aesthetically irrelevant, but then it would seem that inadequate and aesthetically irrelevant responses are largely responsible for our aesthetic preferences, as my current aesthetic preferences are very much a product of those aesthetic pleasures of teenage Bence. 

This is not a trivial problem. Here is one way of making it more urgent: Why should I care about my mature aesthetic judgments if they give me no pleasure? Why should we learn more about art history and the history of twentieth century French literature if the result is that we take less pleasure in engaging with art? 

Here is one way out of this conundrum. We do not take pleasure in any aesthetic judgments. Neither in the naïve one of the kind I made as a teenager (based on the pleasurable experience) nor in the mature one I am making now. Judgment is not the kind of thing we can take pleasure in. Experiences are the kind of things we take pleasure in. So aesthetics should be about experiences, not judgment. These experiences can lead to judgment, which we can communicate to others and that’s a nice optional add-on, but they do not need to lead to judgment. 

We spend so much time and money engaging with works of art not because we (sometimes, not always) make aesthetic judgments about them, but because the experience we have while engaging with works of art can be pleasurable, rewarding and personally meaningful. Judgment is not the kind of thing that can be pleasurable, rewarding or personally meaningful. 

The shift of emphasis from aesthetic judgment to the temporally unfolding aesthetic engagement need not be a radical one. Take Kendall Walton’s account of categories of art, for example [Walton 1970]. 

According to Walton, aesthetic judgment depends on the category of art we apply. His famous example is a thought experiment about a fictional society where the main form of art production are objects (guernicas) that all have the outline shape of Picasso’s Guernica, but that differ in terms of their spatial dimensions (some are flat, like a painting, others are bas-reliefs, and so on). Walton’s main claim is that our aesthetic judgment of Picasso’s Guernica is very different from the aesthetic judgment people would make in this fictional society because we evaluate Picasso’s Guernica as belonging to the category of art ‘paintings’, whereas people in the fictional society evaluate it as belonging to the category of art ‘guernicas’. For us, that the work is dynamic and violent are variable features which distinguish it from other paintings. For the fictional society, in contrast, those features are standard and hardly noticed. Walton’s thought experiment is meant to show that our aesthetic judgment depends on what we take as standard to an art style or genre. Because what we take as standard depends on background art knowledge, our aesthetic judgment depends on our background art knowledge.

More generally, the more precise and more historically informed categories of art we have, the more reliable our aesthetic judgments will become. If I am pronouncing an aesthetic judgment of a Cezanne painting but I have no knowledge of the categories of art ‘impressionism’ or ‘post-impressionism’, this aesthetic judgment will clearly be different from that of someone else who is familiar with these categories of art (and it would be difficult to argue that my aesthetic judgment ‘as a judgment’ is superior to that of my more knowledgeable peers). 

Which categories of art are utilized is clearly important for making aesthetic judgments. But it is also very important for understanding how we experience the artworks. The point is that focusing on the categories provides us with insight into aesthetic experience in a way that focusing on aesthetic judgment does not. In other words, Walton’s observations about the importance of the categories of art in our aesthetic judgment are crucial when we are explaining what features we are attending to and what we are ignoring. 

Remember the Guernica thought experiment. We, in our actual society perceive Picasso’s Guernica as dynamic and violent. And this means we attend to these features and these features characterize our experience of the work. For the fictional society, in contrast, those features are standard and hardly noticed. Hence they play little if any part in a person’s experience of the work. So we can say that what we take as standard to an art style or genre will determine what we attend to. Because what we take as standard depends on background art knowledge, what we know determines how we experience a work. No talk of aesthetic judgments in this argument. Understanding the ways in which our experience is influenced by the categories of art we apply is a key to understanding our aesthetic engagement. 

To sum up, my proposal is to try to move away from the concept of aesthetic judgment in general – whether or not it is mature and historically well-informed. The aim of aesthetic engagement with an artwork is very rarely to come up with an aesthetic judgment and our aesthetic theory should respect this fact. We should focus on the temporal unfolding of our aesthetic experience and not on the (clearly optional) endpoint of pronouncing aesthetic judgments. 

5.
In order to shift the emphasis of aesthetic theory from aesthetic judgment to the temporal unfolding of aesthetic engagement, we need to understand why we aestheticians are obsessed with aesthetic judgments to begin with. 

One reason is clearly historical. The key concept of Western aesthetics has always been that of aesthetic judgment, at least since Hume’s Of the Standard of Taste and Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment. However, it is arguable that Kant’s theory of the judgment of taste constitutes an exception to this neglect of aesthetic experience. Kant’s account of the judgment of taste is incredibly rich and nuanced, and there is no way I could do justice to all the details here. But nonetheless it is important to note, that when he says that the judgment of taste, ‘is an aesthetic judgment, i.e., a judgment that rests on subjective bases, and whose determining basis cannot be a concept’ [Kant 1790, §15, 5:228], it seems that Kant is making a distinction between the experience (the ‘determining basis’) and the judgment that is based on this experience, and aesthetic judgment is identified with the judgment based on the experience (not with the experience). In other words, although aesthetic judgments for Kant are very different from other kinds of judgments, they are judgments nonetheless (that is, they are propositional assertion-like representations that are the outcome of complex mental processes). So, one can reasonably argue that just like Hume before, or analytic aestheticians after, Kant’s emphasis was on judgment and not experience. 

As we shall see in the next section, there are some philosophical reasons why Hume and Kant were focusing on judgments, but the strength of their influence on the field of aesthetics meant that their assumption that the central concern of aesthetics would be with understanding aesthetic judgments went unquestioned. 

Here it is difficult not to point to the idiosyncrasy of this Humean/Kantian perspective if we broaden the scope of what we take to be aesthetics from strictly Western (and mainly Anglo-American, analytic) aesthetics to global aesthetics. The vast majority of aesthetic traditions outside the West are not too concerned with aesthetic judgments at all. They are concerned with the way our emotions unfold, the way our perception is altered and the way aesthetic engagement interacts with social engagement. 

Islamic aesthetics is very much interested in beauty, but not with judgments about beauty, rather with the ways in which beauty could be explained in terms of the working of our perceptual system [Gonzalez 2001]. In fact, it emphasizes the ever-changing, flickering nature of our experience, which makes any judgment impossible (Erzen [2007], see also Davies [2007] on a similar thought in Balinese aesthetics). Chinese aesthetics is very explicitly about the temporally thick experience of artworks and not about the judgment this leads to [Saussy 1993]. Japanese aesthetics emphasizes the transience and incompleteness of the mental processes (like mental imagery) in our engagement and not all-things considered aesthetic judgments [Izutsu and Izutsu 1981; Saito 1997, 2007]. The central concept of Sanskrit aesthetics, which influenced thinking about art not only in India, but also in Indonesia, is that of Raza – explicitly a term for the unfolding process of experience and not the endpoint of aesthetic judgment [Higgins 2007, S. P. Walton 2007]. In Assyro-Babylonian aesthetics, the key concept of Tabritu is about the perceptual experience of the work, not about the judgment about it [Bahrani 2003]. The fact that in our Western tradition aesthetic judgment has played such an important role is little more than an historical curiosity. 

Closer to the present time, analytic aestheticians in the last 70-80 years have been trained extensively as philosophers of language, and philosophy of language is about propositionally and syntactically structured linguistic representations – judgments. This orientation may explain why ‘judgment’ has remained the central concept in analytic aesthetics. 

A good analogy is philosophy of mind and especially philosophy of perception. Contemporary philosophy of mind is an offshoot of philosophy of language. Most formative figures of modern philosophy of mind started out as philosophers of language. This is hardly surprising – almost everyone in the generation that spawned philosophy of mind started out as a philosopher of language. But this focus on language left its mark on the way we now think about the mind – and this is not necessarily a good thing [Wiltsher 2017]. 

Sentences represent the world, as do some of our mental states: thoughts, beliefs, desires. And we understand pretty well how sentences represent the world. So a tempting way of thinking about the mind is that its building blocks are very much like the building blocks of language: that mental states represent the world the way sentences do. 

Sentences express propositions. So, again, it is tempting to think of mental states as representing propositions: as propositional attitudes. And, unsurprisingly, this used to be the standard way of thinking about the mind: that its basic building blocks are propositional attitudes: beliefs, desires, thoughts. The belief that Paris is the capital of France is an attitude to the proposition that Paris is the capital of France. The general suggestion then is that we can capture the functioning of the mind by appealing to this economy of propositions. 

It is easy to see that this way of thinking about the mind is based on mirroring language. But in the last couple of decades philosophy of mind managed to detach itself from its linguistic heritage and, especially in philosophy of perception, refused to just assume without any argument that, say, perception represents in the same way as beliefs. Contemporary philosophy of mind managed to dethrone the ideocracy it inherited from philosophy of language [Nanay 2014].

The hope is that aesthetics can shift in a similar direction and give up its focus on linguistically structured aesthetic judgments. This would mean replacing it with mental states that we may know less about from our philosophy of language studies, but that nonetheless play a crucial role in our aesthetic engagement.

6. 
A less historical, but more substantial reason why the concept of aesthetic judgment has dominated aesthetics is that aesthetic judgments are communicable. When we have aesthetic disagreements, we have disagreements about aesthetic judgments: I say that the film was bad, you say it was good. So in order to understand the intersubjective and social aspects of our engagement with works, the argument would go, we need to focus on aesthetic judgments. 

I do want to take this reason for focusing on aesthetic judgments seriously. It is very true that aesthetics is rarely a solitary endeavour. We share meals, we go to the museum with our friends, and we choose furniture for our flat together. When we go to a concert or to the cinema, we are in a room full of people who are having very similar experiences to our own. We are social beings and there are very few aesthetic situations that are devoid of all social aspects. 

Further, it can be an important link between two friends if they have similar experiences when listening to the same song. And it can be alienating if your friend has a terrible experience while you have a mind-blowing one, while you both watch the same movie. But none of this should compel us to attribute central importance to aesthetic judgments. 

The real question about aesthetic agreements and disagreements is not about who is right and who is wrong. It is about the ways in which our experiences unfold, the ways in which they depend on the allocation of our attention, our background beliefs and knowledge, as well as our past exposure. Knowing how these can alter our experience can help a lot in resolving aesthetic disagreements. 

In fact, we have very strong reasons to doubt the general picture according to which the social aspect of any activity, including aesthetic activity, is to be primarily characterized in terms of the attribution of sentence-like syntactically structured propositional representations, like judgments. In the philosophy of mind, the social aspect of our cognitive life has attracted a lot of interest. The main question there is about how we come to learn about other people’s thoughts, beliefs, emotions and other mental states. 

According to the traditional view, labeled as the ‘theory-theory’ account, we represent other people’s representations [Botterill 1996]. But this view has hardly any proponents any more (the Botterill paper is literally the only reference I found in the last 25 years). Some of the alternatives are more popular and more plausible than others but they all agree that our social interactions should not be described primarily in terms of the attribution of propositional representations, like judgments. The alternatives referred to include: the simulation account [Goldman 1992, 2006a, 2006b; M. Davies 1994; Heal 1995; Gordon 1995a, 1995b; Ravenscroft 1998; Deonna and Nanay 2014;]; the ‘minimal theory of mind’ account [Butterfill and Apperly 2013]; the direct perception account [Dretske 1973; Gallagher 2001, 2005, 2008; Cassam 2007; Goldie 2007; Ratcliffe 2007; Hutto 2007, 2011; Zahavi 2008; Smith 2010; de Bruin, Strijbos and Slors 2011; McNeill 2012]; the mirroring account [Gallese and Goldman 1998; Gallese et al. 2004; Gallese 2005, 2007; Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia 2008; Sinigaglia 2009]; and the vicarious perception account [Nanay 2013]. 

The lesson from this more general philosophy of mind debate for our purposes is that just as social interaction in general is not primarily about the exchange of well-formulated sentences, but about various non-linguistic communicative acts, the same goes for the social dimension of our aesthetic engagement. When you and I listen to music together (the point is even more vivid if we focus on playing, not listening to, music together), whether or not we agree about the aesthetic merit or demerit of the musical piece is just one, relatively minor part of the importance of the social dimension of this activity. What is much more important is how we react to one another’s behavior and how we keep track of the other person’s reaction as our own experience unfolds. Social interaction is more than just linguistic communication and social interaction in an aesthetic context is no exception. 

And focusing on the temporally unfolding experience of artworks and not on the aesthetic judgment this experience may or may not give rise to, can help us to understand more crucial aspects of the social importance of aesthetics than the focus on resolving linguistic disagreements. If we understand how our background knowledge may influence our aesthetic engagement and how shifting our attention from one feature of the artwork to another can lead to a very different experience, may help us to understand why and how your experience is different from mine. And this (not exchanging statements about our respective aesthetic judgments) may actually help bringing our experience closer together. 

7. 
I argued that the obsessive focus on aesthetic judgment has done more harm than good in aesthetics. This focus is a residue of philosophy of language and it has no real justification. It also ignores millennia of aesthetic theorizing in non-Western traditions. Further, the social aspect of our aesthetic engagement, which was supposed to motivate this emphasis on aesthetic judgment does not in fact support it. Crucially, focusing on aesthetic judgment makes it difficult to explain why aesthetic engagement is personally important and pleasurable for us. We should shift the emphasis of aesthetic theory from aesthetic judgment to the temporal unfolding of complex aesthetic engagement (that may or may not lead to an aesthetic judgment).​[4]​ 
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